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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN MICHAEL KRYGER and WIL-
LIAM FREDERICK STEWART, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah 
Sitaroe Prlison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
OaseNo. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Appellants, John Miichael Kryger and William 
Frederick stewart, were denied a petilfJion for iwrit of 
habeas corpus before the Thrird J udicia1 District Courtt, 
in and for Salt Lake County, The Honor.aJble IJeonard W. 
Elton, Presid1ing. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
John Michael Kryger and WiHiam Frederick Sltewart 
pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery on the lOlth day of 
June, 1968, in tJhe Third Judi.dial D:i!stflicit Court, in 01nd for 
Salt Lake County. On December 29, 1969, a petiltion for writ 
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of habeas corpus was filed in tthe Th!ird J udiclial Disitrict 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County. A response of the 
Attorney Genera;l was duly £iled and hearing held on the 
maJtter before the Honorable Leonard W. E1~ton. On the 
14th day of April, 1970, Judgie Elton entered an order de-
nying the appel'lants' wr:i1t of habeas corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of ithe District 
Oourt should ibe affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
John Michael Kryger :and Wiilliam Frederick Stewart 
were arrested on May 15, 1968 (T. 33, 47), and charged 
with robbing one Thomw.s Edwin F1inch (T. 33, 47). Sub-
sequeilltly on June 10, 1968, John Michael Kryger and Wil-
liam Freder:ick Stewart, with counsel, made an inteHigent 
and vdluntary plea of guilty ito 1fue c11ime of rolbibery. (Ar-
raignment and plea T. 1, 2, 3) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS' GUILTY PLEAS WERE VOL-
UNTARILY AND UNDERSTANDINGLY 
MADE AND AS A RESULT WAIVE ALL DE-
FENSES OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVI-
DENCE. 
Counsel for appellanlts s:taJtes that peti1tioneris were 
forced to plead gu~tlty. He puits great sltre.ss on the megal-
irty of the evidence obtained against Kryger and 8te1wart, 
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and claims the guilty pleas were induced as a result of this 
ev1idenc,e. Appellants speoifically complain th rut a oonf es-
sion, a knife, and a lineup (which appeHants claim were 
illegally obtained or accompHshed), coupled with arresting 
officers' faJilure to make a Miranda warning, voids the 
guilty plea. 
Before delvin;_:; into court law on these a:Tlegations, ,it 
is important :to note two points. First, all so-called "illegail 
ev,idence" as represented by appeHanrts is nothing more 
than aHegations on their part. Becau•se ithe appellants 
pleaded gui~ty, trial was never held, and thus oo judge or 
jury ever determined if :the allegations made by Stewart 
and Kryger were true. Second, the guilty pleas by Stewart 
and Kryger were volun:tamly and understandaJbiy given. 
The Judge told them the consequences of :their plea, and 
counsel asked them if they had been coerced in any way 
- both answered no. Then both appellants sttated they 
were pleading gui1lty solely because they were gurlty of the 
crlime char~ed. 
THE COURT: Which one is Stewart? Alright. 
Mr. S1tewart and Mr. Kryger, the Court wants ito 
inform you tha;t this is a felony and in the event 
eilther of you \Should plead guilty thereto or be found 
guility thereof you wilil be subjected to a posstble 
1indeiterminate term in the Utah State Prison. Are 
you aware of tha!t fact, Mr. Stewart? 
MR. STEWART: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you aware of thrut facit, Mr. 
Kryger? 
MR. KRY GER: Yes, ,sir. 
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THE COURT: Record may so show and, also, 
you and each of you have at 'leas1t itwo days and not 
more than ten days before eniteriing pleais to this 
charge unless you desire to waive thaJt ltime and 
enter pleais at this 1time. 
MR. STEWART: I'd li~e to waive it. 
THE COURT: Ailrighit. T'ime may be waived 
on behalf of Defendant Stewart. And, you, Mr. 
Kryger, would also like to 1wa;ive? 
MR. KRYGER: (Nods head.) 
THE COURT: Alright. Time may be waived 
on behalf of the Deferrdanlt Kryger. 
MR. BOWN: Your Honor, prior ito the entry 
of a plea may I have the convenience of the record? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. BOWN: Mr. Stewart and Mr. Kryger, I 
understand at this time you aue about to 'enter a 
pilea of guilty 'to the crime of robbery as charged 
in the Information, which 'Was juslt read Ito you, is 
tha!t correct? 
MR. STEWART: Yes. 
MR. KRYGER: Yes. 
MR. BOWN: Now, in regard to this pl,ea, Mr. 
Stewart and Mr. Kryger, has anyone from my 
off1ice, from the Distrieit AitJtorney's office, the 
County Attorney's offieie, the pal!ice deparitmenrt, :the 
County Sheriff's department, the Court or anyone 
given any promise or done anylthing Ito coerce you 
into pleading guilty to this charge as you've just 
heard read to you, Mr. Stewart, and Mr. Kryger? 
Answer audibly, would you please? 
MR. STEWART: No. 
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MR. KRY GER: No. 
MR. BOWN : Then I understand you're enter-
ing a plea of guilty solely because you are guilty of 
the crime ,as charged here, is that right? 
MR. STEWART: Yes. 
MR. KRYGER: Yes. 
(Arraignment and Plea T. 2, 3.) 
The transcript in the haibeas oorpus proceeding also 
seems to indicaite Kryger and Stewart knew 1they were 
guilty and gave voluntary p1leas. 
Q. And did you subsequently plead gui'lit;y? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you tell the Court whether this evi-
dence, the identi.fication, the presence of the knife, 
the orther things, the statement that you made, in-
duced to any extent your plea? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Whart was your reason for pleading? 
A. We jusrt thought we'd just get out there 
and do our time because they S'aid it would be until 
about December and we didn't wanJt to wait around 
in the County jail for aboult eight monJths. 
Q. Did you bel1ieve 1there was no orther alliterna-
ti ve than to plead guii1lty in view of this eviidence? 
A. No, sir. 
(T. 40.) 
The above transcripts clearly indicate !that Stewart 
and Kryger voluntarily and rintelligenrtly, with rthe advice 
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of counsel, pleaded guilrty to rthe Cl'ime charged, especiially in 
light of a recen:t T'enth Circuit decision: 
"It is a fundamental basic right that an accused 
be advised of the narture of charges against him and 
consequences of p'lea of guilty; however, it is not 
mandatory ,that judge ri1tualisticaHy and personally 
advise accused of 1these maitter·s; 'it is sufficiient that 
,the accused be in fact ,aware of such regardless of 
the source from where the information comes; the 
accused can he pult on reail notice through hi1s own 
lawyer." Miller V. Crouse, 346 F. 2d 301 (loth Cir. 
1965). Id. at 306. See a:l•so: William v. Cox, 350 F. 
2d 849 (10th Cir. 1965). 
Because petitionier1s Stewart 1and Kryger pleaded gllii'lty 
to ithe crime charged, they have no basis to bring 1the pres-
ent habeas corpus. Irt is a welll known rule of law, supported 
to decisions of ithe Urnted Stakes Supreme Court, tilmt a;ll 
non-jurisd'ic1Jiona:l defects are waived on a plea of guilty. 
Kercheval V. United States, 274 U. S. 220 (1926). There-
:fore, peltJitioners' c'laims of iNegal evidence, forced confes-
sion, which in turn forced the guHty plea, iHegal Wineup, 
and incomplete Miranda warning which are non-jurisdic-
rtiona;l claims were waived when they pleaded .guiiity. 
In a United Sita!tes Supreme Court cas'e dealing wilth 
Rule II of the Federa;l Rules of Crriminal Procedure, the 
majority opinion sltates the following: 
"A defendant who entem such a plea (guilty) 
simultaneously wailves several consrtirtulffi:ona!l rights, 
including his piiivi'lege agari.nslt oompusory self-in-
criminaitlion, h!is right tto :trial by jury, and his right 
to confront hlis accusers. For this wa:iver to be valid 
under rthe due process clause, iit must be 'an inten-
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tri.onal relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
iighrt or privi1lege.'" McCarthy v. United States, 
394 U. S. 459 ( 1969) . Id. at 465. 
This same prinoiple was alsq held in Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 u. s. 238 (1969). 
"Severa;} federal constitutional r,ighJts are in-
volved in a waiver thaJt takes place when a plea o.f 
guil.Jty is entered in a sitate criminal trial. First, is 
the pr,ivilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
guaranlteed by the Fifth Amendment and appilicable 
to the s1tate by reason of the fourteenth. Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. Second i 1s the right to trfal by 
a jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 14'5. Third 
is the right to confront one's accusers. Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400." Id. at 243. 
This year lthe Supreme Coum has handed down a de-
cision which exp,ands the McCarthy, and Boykin decisions, 
supra. In McMann v. Richardson, ______ U. S. ______ , 90 S. Ot. 
1441 (1970)' lthe coum held: 
"Because guilty plea is a waiver of trial and, 
unless applioruble law 01t'hel'!Wlise provides, a waiver 
of right to consent admissibility of any evidence 
state might have offered against defendant, guilty 
plea must be an fo.rtelligenit ract done with sufficient 
awareness of rellevalllt circumstances and 1,ikely con-
sequences." Id. at 1446. (Emphasis added.) 
In UtaJh there ·is no other appUcablie law 1and of courise, the 
Supreme Coulit decision ·is binding - a gud.1lty plea waives 
right to consent to 'admissibHiity of ev·idence by defendant. 
This dec'istion specifically prohibits Kryger and Stewart 
from alleging rthe evidence was 1inegaHy seized, !through 
their guilty pleas they waived consent of prohiib'.iting evi-
dence 1in court. 
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McMann v. Richardson, supra, ailso held thart a guilty 
plea resul~ing from a confession is not grounds to allege 
a coerced or induced plea. (In the present situation petJi-
tioners claim the conf essfon of Kry.ger could not be used 
against Srtewart and that the confession was coerced.) 
"New York defendants, who with !the advice of 
counsel had entered plews of gui!lty, were not en-
titled ito hearing on hwbeas corpus petitioners alleg-
ing 1tha!t ·their confessions had been coerced and thalt 
the improperly procured confessions induced their 
guilty please where ithere was no further showing." 
Id. at 1449. 
See also Parker v. North Carolina, ______ U. 8. ______ , 90 
S. Ct. 1458 (1970); and Brady v. United States, ______ U.S. 
______ , 90 iS. Ct. 1463 ( 1970) . 
The other federal courts including '1Jhe T,enth Circuit 
adhere to the same principle. N Olte the folllowing 'language 
taken from Benton v. United States, 352 F. 2d 59 (loth 
Oir. 1965) wherein the defendant alleged that 1there was 
an i'1legal search and seizure, coercion, and iJllegal confes-
sions. 
"In view of the allegwtion of fiact made by ap-
peHantt on this appeal with respect 'to the search 
and seizure, 1the coercion, and the confession issues, 
we agree with 1appelilee that appellant's plea of 
guHty prevents any consideration thereof on this 
point." Id. at 60. 
In another T1enlbh Circuit case, Lattin v. Cox, 355 F. 
2d 397 (10th Cir. 1966), rbhe appellant (appeal from denirail 
.of his habews corpus pefiition) presented several 1issues at 
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the pretrial hearing; thaJt no warrant was issued for ap-
pellant's arrest; his plea of gui:lty was not vuluntary; that 
statement made to police orf ficers was without his knowl-
edge and hence illegal; that property was taken through 
an illegal search and seizure; and finally, he compla;ins of 
cruel and unusua1l punishment and delay in being brought 
before a justice of the peace. The Tenth Circuit then held: 
"Afrter a caref u1l consideration of the entire 
r·ecord before us, we must conclude that the pleas of 
guHty entered by Lattin in the •.srtaite court to the 
charges of involuntary mans~aughter and rape were 
voluntary and understandingly made and were not 
induced by any promises or threats. Such pleas of 
gui11ty w1aived all nonjurisd:ictional defects in pro-
ceedings had prfor thereto." Id. at 400. 
State court precedence is also in accord. The .Supreme 
Court of Arizona in State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 2115, 427 
P. 2d 533 (1967) staJtes the fo1Howing: 
"We f1ind no va-lid:ity in this argument for none 
of the matters comp1la:ined of by defiendanlt attacks 
any juri1sdictional defect in the proceedings and iJt 
itS ·a weH •esfal:JJ.:ished rule of law ithat when a de-
fendanlt volunltarily and knowingly pleads guii:ltty at 
his trial such consitiltutes a w:aJiver of nonjurisdic-
tional defenses, defects and irregularities." Id. 3Jt 
534. 
From these cases, it is clear that a guilty pfoa similar 
to Kryger and Stewarts', which are volu:nJtarily and knOiw-
ingly given, walive aJll nonjurisdicitiional defenses, defects or 
irregularities. 
AppeUan:ts try to distinguish rthe M cM ann deoision 
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on two counts. First, he 1states that the Supreme Court 
decision 'in M cM ann, supra, is a minoriJty view and goes 
agaiinst reason. A Supreme Court deciision i1s nort consli.dered 
a minority vi,ew, on the contrary iit is considered lthe su-
preme law of the land! Most of appellanits' b11ief is based 
on Supreme Court decisfons which were so oa:Hed "minor-
ity dec'isions". Where appl1icable, Supreme Court decisions i 
are the final and au:bhoriltarl:Jive 'law of America. 
Appellants al1so try to amtack or distinguish McMann 
on the basis of incompetent counsel. McMann held "plea 
of guilty in state court is not subject rto collaterail attack 
in federal court on ground thart it was motivated by a co-
erced confession unless defendants were 'incompetently ad-
vised by their attorney." Id. a:t 1948. Appellants assert 
original counsel was incompetent and therefore McMann 
does not apply. Counsel for appellants was and is a :well-
known and respected lawyer in the community. He was : 
with appellants when they pleaded guilty and surely advised 
appellants as 1Jo whart he thought was best for them. Even 
the Supreme Court realizes how hard it is to advise your 
client whether or not to plead guilty. 
"But because of inherent uncertainty in guilty 
plea advice .... " McMann v. Richardson, ______ U. 
S. ______ , 90 S. Ct. 1441. Id. at 1449. 
"Considerations like these [whether or not to 
plead guilty] frequently present imponderable que3-
tions for which there are no certain ans·wers; judg-
ments may be made which in the light of later 
events seem improvident, although they were per-
f ectly sensible at the time." Brady v. lJnited States, 
______ U. S. ______ , 90 S. Ct. 1-!63 ( 1970). Id. at 1473. 
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In Syddall v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 437 P. 2d 194 
( 1968) , the court looked to the record 1to see if anything 
suggested that the prisoner had been improperly induced 
to enter his plea of guilty. Since nothing was shown, lbhe 
court held itha;t he had been adequately represented by 
counsel. 
Arizona 1aHows a conte!lltJion of deprivaroion of adequate 
counsel to be aeserted in habeas covpus proceedings only 
in extreme cases: 
"If appellanlt sets f orith no facts which indlicaite 
the appointed attorney's performance w~ so suib-
s'tlandard as to render rthe tri1al a f:arce or sham, ithe 
petition is properly den~ed." Baron v. State, 7 Ariz. 
App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975 (1968). Id. at 977. 
Consiiderung rthe transcr~pit, original counsel's reputa-
tion, and a;H circumstances involved, it ;is difficult to un-
derstand why or when counsel was inadequate, raither, re-
spondent collltends that originaJl counsel for petilbioners was 
completely oompetenlt and advised h:i!s clients to rthe best 
of Ms :abrnty. 
"When def endanlt weighs his SltaJte courit reme-
dies and aidmi!ts his gui1t, he does so under the law 
then existing and assumes risk of ordinary error 
in either his or his attorney's assessment of law and 
facts, and ailltlhouglh he might have pleaded differ-
ently ha:d 1aJter decided cases ithen been the i,aw, he 
is bound by his plea, and his conviction will not be 
set aside unless he can allege and prove serious 
derelicltions on part of counsel sufflicienrt to show 
thrut his plea was no:t a knowing and initeUigenlt art." 
McMann v. Richardson, supra. (Emphasis added.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The respondent respeetful'ly submilts lthart the haJbeas 
oorpus petition shouild be deil!ied. Peilitioners Stewart and 
Kryger entered an inteWigent and voluntary guilty plea, 
and based on cases cirted, they have no rigihlt fo allege their 
oonsrtnitutional rights were viol,ated. Respondent prays that 
1the lower court order denyiing the pettiti:on for hialbeas cor-
pus be affirmed. 
Respectfully submiltted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
AitJtorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chiief Assistant Arttorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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